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This thesis examines the broader federalism implications of fusion centers. From a 
constitutional perspective, these bodies matter because they stand squarely at the 
crossroads of federal, state, law enforcement, and intelligence concerns. Although 
collating state law enforcement information existed prior to 9/11, the growing linkage 
with a national homeland security mission spawns an entirely new set of issues.  
The lines separating the levels and responsibilities of government, once clear and 
distinct, have now become ambiguous and confusing, thereby enabling states to reassert 
their power vis-à-vis the federal government. The decentralized nature of the overall 
homeland security apparatus and the growing complexity of the assigned tasks enable 
fusion centers, and thus the states themselves to rise in stature. Because each state is free 
to tailor its own security framework, fusion centers enjoy the kind of flexibility urgently 
needed in today’s domestic security environment.   
This thesis addresses the recent advances in federalism by exploring two pillars of 
fusion center characteristics. The first section can be construed to be the “hardware” 
piece; that is, the missions and structures under which they operate. The second section 
investigates the “software” side, or the databases and networks containing the 
information and intelligence. 
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Much of the legal and political discussion of the broader homeland security 
response to national security threats since 9/11 focuses on the real, potential, and 
perceived threats to civil liberties and constitutional norms. Typically, such analysis, 
however it comes down on the debate, fails to consider the underlying convention of 
American legal thought and practice: federalism. Arguably, the whole framework of 
shared and exclusive rights and responsibilities among the states and localities and the 
national government and their respective institutions exists to preserve and promote civil 
liberties—as yet another check and balance on governmental power, even (or especially) 
in times of crisis. In other words, the framers of the Constitution purposely diffused the 
available authority among the nation’s various organizational layers to further ensure the 
protection of the common citizen.   
In declaring “the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people,” 
the Tenth Amendment assuaged the fears of a central government replete with 
innumerable controls.1  States and localities thus retain considerable powers and 
prerogatives into which the federal government cannot intrude. While the national 
security—“provid[ing] for the common defense”—marks a national-level concern, law 
enforcement as most citizens conceive of the activity remains at the sub-federal level, that 
is, state or local. However, post-9/11 homeland security initiatives have come to 
symbolize a major change in American-style federalism. Powers initially reserved to the 
respective levels of government—federal, state, local, and tribal— are increasingly 
merging across long-established boundaries. Where there is chaos, there are dangers to 
normative governing doctrines. 
Perhaps nowhere is this dynamic more evident than in the rise of fusion centers, 
state-run agencies tasked with melding intelligence from all levels of government. 
Defined as “a collaborative effort of two or more Federal, State, local, or tribal 
                                                 
1 U.S. Constitution, Tenth Amendment. 
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government agencies that combines resources, expertise, or information with the goal of 
maximizing the ability of such agencies to detect, prevent, investigate, apprehend, and 
respond to criminal or terrorist activities,” they represent a developing approach to 
homeland security.2  They are well-established entities in many states, while in others, 
the centers are only beginning to open their doors for business. Thus, their lasting impact 
on American governance remains unresolved. If fusion centers do advance the interests 
and prerogatives of the state and local authorities vis-à-vis the federal government, do the 
hard-won checks and balances of procedure and law follow, preserving the structures and 
mechanisms that ensure basic civil liberties?   Moreover, if fusion centers pose extensive 
questions the core federalism configuration, do they threaten national security in the long 
run, or do they buttress nationwide security efforts?   
Typically after a disaster of national proportions, the executive branch and the 
federal government in general take more power.  This assumption of greater 
responsibilities is not unexpected and has been seen as happening since 9/11, both with 
the Bush and Obama administrations.  However, the establishment of a network of state 
and local intelligence fusion centers since 9/11 provides an important example in which 
the federal government has shared responsibilities with other levels of government 
instead of proceeding ahead on its own. This thesis examines how fusion centers fit 
within the American federalist system of government, and argues that when examined 
from this relatively little-used perspective, we can understand significant aspects of their 
development.  
A. CHALLENGES FROM BOTH DIRECTIONS 
Fusing various pieces of information to construct a clearer picture of threats or 
situations is a desirable goal for both intelligence and law enforcement. Acquiring and 
processing that information, however, can be fraught with peril for the civil libertarian or  
 
 
                                                 
2 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Public Law 110-53, 
http://intelligence.senate.gov/laws/pl11053.pdf, 322.  
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the citizen under investigation. The implications of these relatively new fusion processes 
remain unresolved and stimulate broader questions about the general direction of 
American governance.   
1. Federal Offensive…? 
Critics of the current homeland security approach, including operators on both 
sides of the federal divide, complain that, for example, the numerous national strategies 
and standards compel state and local entities to adhere to an ever-increasing number of 
rules set forth by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other federal agencies 
in the name of improving, if not perfecting, the nation’s defense. Generally speaking, 
such measures as strict federal grant usage guidelines or exacting disaster preparedness 
checklists prompt wide-ranging concern that overbearing national control is replacing the 
long-standing balance of coordination and collaboration that state and local institutions 
had forged and enjoyed before September 11. Fusion centers thus possibly exemplify the 
breakdown of traditional state-federal law enforcement boundaries, persistent federal 
involvement and funding to state law enforcement initiatives, and what amounts to an 
expanding nationalized homeland security enterprise.   
In the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), DHS defined that 
enterprise as “the collective efforts and shared responsibilities of federal, state, local, 
tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-sector partners—as well as individuals, 
families, and communities—to maintain critical homeland security capabilities.”3  
Though states retain fundamental jurisdiction of their fusion centers, there are indicators 
pointing to an overall lessening of control and, thus, a further diminution in federalism. 
Consequently, the federally led homeland security measures put in place in the past 
decade raise elemental questions about federalism and the power of state and local 
authorities.   
                                                 
3 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report, February 
2010, viii. 
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2. … or State Expansion? 
On the other hand, despite significant constitutional concerns about fusion 
centers, the prospect exists that they actually represent a strengthening of state power, 
thereby enhancing federalism and reinforcing constitutional principles, not threatening 
them. Though the fusion concept pre-dated 9/11 as a means of boosting traditional state 
law enforcement capabilities, the attacks pushed states into either establishing new 
centers, or modifying existing ones to meet the new homeland security demands; 
consequently, conventional policing roles of the states expanded into entirely different 
areas.4  Because homeland security at the non-federal levels evolved to include such 
priorities as Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) protection, public health, 
public safety, disaster preparedness, state and local bodies have assumed greater 
responsibilities and power.  
Furthermore, states now possess an unparalleled level of access and integration 
into the national intelligence and law enforcement systems thereby enhancing their 
influence. Leveraging these national capabilities enables states to better protect their 
constituents and respond to threats without solely relying on federal intervention. In that 
sense, fusion centers represent a progression in federalism and showcase an elevation of 
state power vis-à-vis the national government.   
B. OF FUSION AND FEDERALISM 
While fusion centers elicit concerns about such democratic ideals as Fourth 
Amendment civil liberties, they also elicit questions about the very structure by which the 
democracy operates. The Tenth Amendment establishes limits on the central 
government’s authorities by leaving the bulk of powers to the states, not the least of 
which is law enforcement.  Madison, in Federalist #4, exhorts this with the 
pronouncement that state, not federal, responsibilities would “concern the lives, liberties, 
and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the 
                                                 
4 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for 
Congress, by Todd Masse, CRS Report RL34070 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information 
and Publishing, July 6, 2007), 1. 
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State.”5  The premise behind these specifications came from the American distrust of an 
overpowering and intrusive central government like the British monarchy. Federalism 
was not simply intended as a better style of government, it was conceived of to protect 
the most fundamental rights and liberties of the American citizen.   
So, after two centuries of federalism-based democracy, why should the United 
States be concerned with the ten-year evolution of fusion centers?  The reason is that 
lines separating the levels and responsibilities of government, once clear and distinct, 
have now become ambiguous and confusing. For example, a local police officer sitting in 
a fusion center now enjoys access to federal level intelligence products, albeit partially 
sanitized versions. Conversely, federal agents co-located in the same center often find 
themselves sifting through routine level law enforcement complaints, ostensibly because 
they possibly involve potential terror activities. Because fusion centers remain firmly 
planted at the juncture of state, local, federal, and private interests, they must navigate 
their way through the maze of three vital operations: intelligence, law enforcement, and 
public safety. Performing just one of those critically important security functions is an 
arduous task. The larger question is can they successfully execute all three while 
preserving civil liberties and federalism?  
One of the principal controversies surrounding fusion center evolution involves 
the merging and overlap of previously separate responsibilities. For these state-run 
entities, the dividing line between national intelligence and law enforcement efforts often 
meanders, or is erased altogether. In addition, traditional boundaries continue to 
disappear with fusion center funding and manning. The continued presence of national 
agency (DHS, Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], etc.) liaisons and a steady stream of 
federal subsidization invariably leads to questions on just how state-centric these centers 
are. Likewise, efforts to link these state bodies into what is becoming known as the 
National Network of Fusion Centers yields still greater questions as to the future 
composition of federalism. These categories clearly represent more typical law 
enforcement concerns at the state and local level. 
                                                 
5 James Madison, Federalist #45, Library of Congress, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fedpapers.html.  
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Concurrently, states also initiated the rise of fusion centers to serve their own 
intelligence needs better. Though counterterrorism provided the main impetus for fusion 
center development, states now utilize the construct for a variety of their own law 
enforcement purposes that potentially fall below the federal threshold. Case in point is the 
Illinois Statewide Terrorism Intelligence Center (STIC), which commenced its operations 
in 2003. Its name bespeaks a heavy concentration of federally-focused homeland security 
needs, but yet the center also maintains “units specializing in other categories of criminal 
activity, including narcotics, violent crimes, sex offenses, and motor vehicle theft.”6 
With responsibilities as diverse as auto theft and terrorism, it is no wonder a 
fusion centers must walk a thin line between serving the needs of the municipality, state, 
or the nation. As a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report indicates, “the rise of 
fusion centers is representative of a recognition that non-traditional actors—state and 
local law enforcement and public safety agencies—have an important role to play in 
homeland defense and security.”7  But how much of a role and who decides?  Serious 
federalism and constitutional concerns arise when normal state and local policing 
activities take place within the guise of counterterrorism, such as surveillance and 
investigations of suspicious individuals. These police actions end up shaping national-
level counterterror decisions.   
To further complicate matters, the 2006 Fusion Center Guidelines published by 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) and DHS stipulate, “[the ideal] fusion center involves 
every level and discipline of government, private sector entities, and the public.”8   If 
these state-run bodies are supposed to incorporate everybody (including the federal 
liaison officers assigned to them), does this not threaten long-cherished separation of 
powers?  However, the opposite may be true. State involvement in non-traditional aspects 
involving national security may signify advancing power for the sub-federal levels of 
                                                 
6 National Governors Association Center for Best Practices, “Establishing State Intelligence Fusion 
Centers,” July 2005, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=455819, 9. 
7 Masse and Rollins, A Summary of Fusion Centers: Core Issues and Options for Congress (CRS 
Report RL 34177), 2. 
8 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing 
Information in a New Era, August 2006, 3. 
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government. The merging and subsequent overlap of the domestic intelligence problem 
potentially offers states enhanced leverage in ways that were unimaginable in the days 
before 9/11. If the states actively embrace the new responsibilities brought on by the 
advent of homeland security, does this represent a significant alteration to federalism? 
After all, the Constitution does not specify exactly what the states can do, only that they 
(and their citizens) will be able to possess powers not designated for the national 
government.  
C. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter II provides details of the intellectual and organizational underpinnings of 
both fusion centers and federalism. The surprising aspect of the fusion center model—
here, the extent to which fusion centers did not toll the end of local law enforcement or 
state protections of citizens’ rights—derives from the theory and the practice of American 
democracy, especially as regards Constitutional civil liberties. The fluctuations in the 
exercise of federalism through American history reveals much both about the strengths 
and potential pitfalls of the system. 
Chapter III examines how the designated missions and structures of fusion centers 
offer show states advancing powers their powers in the homeland security realm. The 
ability for states to tweak fusion center task parameters while creating flexible 
organizational configurations provides substantial opportunities to enhance sub-federal 
strengths. Because fusion centers are exclusively state-run entities, they benefit, in turn, 
from the individualities of the 50 separate components of the Union. Just as citizens 
derive identities based on where they live, so too do fusion centers achieve their own 
unique characteristics while still operating under the broader homeland security umbrella.  
Chapter IV assesses the intelligence and information processes used by fusion 
centers. For example, the burgeoning information sharing frameworks offers ample 
debate as to whether or not states can maintain their well-established public safety 
standing in the face of an expanding federal presence. The technological advances of the 
database arrangements enable unprecedented connectivity between previously isolated 
sections of the government. The networking phenomenon breaks down barriers and leads 
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to greater distribution of information and intelligence, but questions remains as to how 
this affects state roles and state powers. 
 Chapter V concludes the thesis with a determination of how significantly fusion 
centers affect American federalism. In his book, In the Common Defense, James E. Baker 
states: “Liberty is a security value because where national security puts exceptional stress 
on constitutional values…the rule of law helps regulate that stress through the faithful 
execution of the constitutional structure and statutory procedure.”9  Fusion centers are a 
microcosm of those stresses and represent a valid test of the state of American 
federalism. Thus far, they appear to be a achieving a passing grade and continue to 
further cement themselves into the framework of American governance. More 
importantly, they have altered the very calculus of federalism.   
Instead of viewing powers gained by one level as simultaneous losses by the 
other, fusion centers demonstrate the concept of mutual advances. Each level of 
government gains something from their establishment. The federalism discussion remains 
a deeply rooted concept in American government. It, like the nation itself, endures 
constant alterations and fluctuates according to the prevailing sentiments of leadership 
from all levels of government. 
                                                 
9 James E. Baker, In The Common Defense: National Security Law for Perilous Times (Cambridge 
University Press: New York, 2007), 31. 
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II. DEFINING THE UNDEFINABLE 
Fusion centers represent a notable element of an evolving homeland security 
strategy. The ability for these centers to piece together disparate pieces of data while 
working within a national network holds great potential for counterterrorism and public 
safety requirements. But what exactly are these state-run bodies and why do they matter? 
And how do they implicate the past, present, and future of American federalism? 
A. FUSION CENTERS: AN OVERVIEW 
Some fusion centers provide a regional focus within a single state while others 
concentrate solely on a major urban area that may or may not spill over the border of an 
adjacent state. There is no single jurisdictional model.   
Additionally, because they “incorporate law enforcement officers, other 
emergency response providers, and, as appropriate, the private sector, into all relevant 
phases of the intelligence and fusion process,” fusion centers do not possess a common 
organizational model either; consequently, they also symbolize a fundamental 
transformation of traditional government roles and responsibilities.10  Instead of 
operating from a strictly reactive stance, these law enforcement conglomerations have 
shifted to a more proactive posture, using domestic intelligence as a means to thwart even 
mundane criminal acts. The quest for greater overall safety and security obliges the 
nation’s law enforcement intelligence to become more anticipatory.   
Fusion centers matter because they stand squarely at the crossroads of federal, 
state, law enforcement, and intelligence concerns. Although the idea of collating law 
enforcement information among the states existed prior to 9/11, the growing linkage with 
a national homeland security mission spawns an entirely new set of issues. Defending the 
United States previously fell neatly within the confines of the federal government, but 
now the country has expanded protection responsibilities down to state and local  
 
                                                 
10 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, 322. 
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authorities. Empowering state fusion centers to assist with national obligations raises 
substantial questions about the continued legitimacy of individual liberties and American 
federalism. 
B. FEDERALISM: AN OVERVIEW 
In a basic sense, federalism itself focuses on an arrangement where “sovereignty 
in federal political orders is non-centralized, often constitutionally, between at least two 
levels so that units at each level have final authority and can be self-governing in some 
issue area. Citizens thus have political obligations to, or have their rights secured by, two 
authorities.”11  In the United States, these two bodies in question generally are the 
national government and the states. However, the progression of American federalism 
now also involves other subnational elements such as local and regional authorities that, 
in turn, comprise the manning of the various fusion centers scattered throughout the 
states. These fusion centers operate at the bidding of their particular state and, because of 
the unique requirements of the individual states, are exceedingly non-standard in their 
composition, let alone their mission. It is a difficult, if not impossible, task to adequately 
characterize these bodies. The same can be said of the all-encompassing national defense 
initiative after 9/11: homeland security. 
The advent of homeland security (the entire endeavor, not just DHS) 
fundamentally altered the federalism discourse and the two have been inextricably linked 
ever since. As with federalism, the strict definition of homeland security evades scholars, 
public officials, and practitioners. Though significant efforts have been made to neatly 
characterize its meaning and clearly demarcate its frontiers, homeland security continues 
to be a vague backdrop within all levels of government. Even at the very top level of 
government, the experiences of a decade have done little to shore up a coherent 
understanding of what it truly means.   
In January 2013, the CRS published a report addressing this very issue that laid 
bare these difficulties. Included in the report was a separate table with no less than seven 
                                                 
11 Andreas Føllesdal, “Federalism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2010 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), March 9, 2010, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/federalism/. 
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varying definitions of homeland security, all of which were derived from multiple federal 
publications published since 2007.12   One could possibly expect such a wide variance if 
they had been derived from the earliest attempts at corralling the issue after 9/11, but as 
the report duly notes, “the competing and varied definitions in these documents may 
indicate there is no succinct homeland security concept.”13  This observation begs the 
question: if the originators of homeland security have yet to narrow down a strong 
refinement of the phrase by 2012, can anybody actually do it?  Or, perhaps, should 
anybody? 
Christopher Bellavita touches on this notion of potentially futile efforts at setting 
out to codify homeland security by stating experts engage in “long and occasionally 
contentious conversations about the details…and only rarely mention what that word 
means.”14  He goes further to stipulate that perhaps the lack of absolutes serves a greater 
purpose because “the absence of agreement can be seen as grist for the continued 
evolution of homeland security as a practice and as an idea.”15   
1. Madison to Maturation: Federalism Before 2001  
The American debate over federalism existed long before homeland security 
became a priority. Controversy existed at the very beginning of the debates over the 
Constitution and the Federalist Papers, the series of texts written by James Madison, 
Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, were designed to ensure its ratification. Though a 
comprehensive review involving the nuances of these works is far beyond the scope of 
this thesis, the impassioned pleas of the Federalists to appease those who feared a 
domineering national government also resonate when viewed in the context of today’s 
homeland security’s debates.   
                                                 
12 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Defining Homeland Security: Analysis 
and Congressional Considerations, by Shawn Reese, CRS Report R42462 (Washington, DC: Office of 
Congressional Information and Publishing, January 8, 2013), 8. 
13 Reese, Defining Homeland Security: Analysis and Congressional Considerations (CRS Report 
42462), 10. 
14 Christoper Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: What is Homeland Security?,” Homeland 
Security Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 2 (June 2008), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=487086, 1. 
15 Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: What is Homeland Security?,” 20. 
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For example, James Madison in Federalist No. 46 appealed to his audience, “that 
the members of the federal will be more dependent on the members of the State 
governments, than the latter will be on the former.”16  The framers of the Constitution 
(and implementers of the subsequent Bill of Rights) refrained from over-specifying what 
authorities the central government would maintain. By denoting the limits of national 
power, the Tenth Amendment made federalism a guiding principle of American 
government that stood “as a bulwark against federal intrusion on state authority and 
individual liberty.”17  
As the country evolved into the 19th century, so, too, did the understanding and 
interpretation of federalism, especially from a judicial perspective. For example, the 
landmark 1819 Supreme Court case of McCulloch v. Maryland, established the validity 
of implied federal government powers, not just those exclusively specified in the 
Constitution.18  The slow shifts in federalism would gain momentum in the coming 
decades as the nation witnessed a growing divide from the contentious and threatening 
issues of slavery and states’ rights. When the Civil War started in 1861, it spawned 
perhaps the most influential moment in American history and fundamentally changed the 
nation’s concept of federalism. The Civil War permanently cemented the supremacy of 
the nation over the states; moreover, it also demonstrated the extraordinary powers the 
federal government could deploy against the states (and the population) in such exigent 
circumstances. As evidenced by the suspension of habeas corpus, military tribunals, and 
other emergency powers, “President Lincoln had massive and nearly unchecked authority 
to suppress an insurrection and that it was at least largely under this aegis that he 
undertook most of his actions (and that his actions should be sustained). But the reason 
Lincoln had such power was just as clear: Congress, not the Constitution, had given it to 
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him.”19  In order to preserve the country, the federal government had arguably violated 
the Constitution by repudiating many cherished principles of federalism and liberty. 
Would this model always predominate when the government experienced a deep, 
domestic crisis?   
A century and a half later, the United States faced another critical domestic 
challenge when the 9/11 terror attacks galvanized the country into a homeland security-
centric model. The preliminary rhetoric from the government indicated a significant 
change from what had been demonstrated in the past. In the initial National Homeland 
Security Strategy of 2002, not only was there an entire section devoted to federalism, but 
also it also explicitly intoned that “the federal government must look to state 
governments to facilitate close coordination and cooperation among all levels of 
government.”20  Despite the terrorism crisis reaching a national-level threshold, 
American leadership still felt compelled to invoke the time-honored concept of 
federalism by stating the country needed all levels of its government to do the job. Why? 
Perhaps it was that, on some intrinsic level, Americans still believe those who govern 
closest to them can better protect their rights and liberties. This intellectual insistence on 
federalism may or may not be operationally correct in the homeland security realm. 
However, although the 2002 Homeland Security Strategy cautiously references 
the powers of the states, an academic review of government policy in the decades leading 
up to 9/11 reveals a different arrangement that, instead, showcased a greater distribution 
of power to the federal side. For one thing, instituting the federal income tax through 
1913’s Sixteenth Amendment produced a significant revenue stream. Not only did this 
extra funding expand government capabilities, Samuel Clovis also found, but “the 
inevitable swing of the pendulum of power…moved decidedly toward the central 
government, with virtually no chance of returning to anything resembling the dual 
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federalism…[prior to the] national personal income tax.”21  Clovis, in this work and 
others, postulates that the federal government’s power has increased because the size of 
its purse has grown. But it was not just the accumulation of revenue that altered 
federalism, it was the downward flow that fundamentally altered the game. The 
promulgation of money back to the states in the form of grants acts as “the primary 
mechanism[s] for influencing behaviors at the state and local level” and, ultimately, 
exemplifies the framework of coercive federalism.22 
Other scholarship further expounds on the changed landscape of state and national 
governmental relationships by the time 9/11 occurred. The vast majority of actions 
executed by the different levels of government were anything but related to national 
security needs and, in fact, the federal-to-state homeland security-funding still remains a 
paltry percentage of the overall distribution of funds given by the federal government. 
However, Judge Richard Posner notes the contemporary federalism alignment by stating, 
“[homeland security] epitomizes what we’ve done in some ways with the rest of domestic 
government…there are very few local functions anymore that have been left untouched 
by the centralization and nationalization of policy in the past sixty years.”23  Accordingly, 
as the national government expanded its reach to many subnational areas as disparate as 
education and disaster relief, the overall trend gravitated towards a coercive style of 
federalism. This model, whereby national mandates strain state capabilities to meet them, 
is highlighted by Clovis and echoed by Posner as being “less preferable, but…more 
inevitable.”24  Thus, as the United States approached the end of the 20th century, the 
pattern had been set for ever-expanding government centralization and an entrenchment 
of coercive federalism.   
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2. 9/11’s Federalism Hangover 
Even eleven years removed from that fateful September day, the long-term effects 
on the American system of governance continue to be debated—much like the debate in 
the immediate aftermath of the terror attacks. Because 9/11 ushered in a frenzied 
combination of introspection (how could we have allowed ourselves to be attacked from 
within?) and outrage (how are we going to avenge our losses?), the prevailing discourse 
focused on the potential to alter the national government’s calculus in meeting these 
unprecedented challenges. 
a. Pros and Cons 
On the one-year anniversary of the crucible event, Charles Wise and Rania 
Nader wrote an article foreshadowing the distinctions of what eventually became the 
homeland security “enterprise.”  They articulated that the country would evolve into two 
governing frameworks, one with a broad nationwide strategy and the other becoming a 
system of networks linking all levels.25  In addition, they rejected the assumption that 
tweaking the governance system because of homeland security would result in a 
hierarchical scheme; therefore, the sense of federalism would endure and the states would 
maintain their strong commitment to maintaining their own special commitments.26  In a 
similar theme, and around the same timeframe, Dale Krane addressed the trend toward 
heightened federalism in 2002 by noting “a new realization that without the participation 
of state and local governments, no strategy requiring nationwide efforts would 
succeed.”27 
Wise, Nader, and Krane all subscribed to the concept that the change in 
American federalism would steer toward decentralization and not toward a further 
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consolidation of national power. Despite the substantial growth of federal government 
visibility in the months after 9/11 (e.g., armed soldiers guarding airports), some scholars 
were not apt to accept that this would become the norm. Another pair of voices with 
concurrent views, John Kincaid and Richard Cole, looked specifically at the pending 
counterterrorism response to federalism. From their vantage point, they believed it 
“should revitalize federalism” and “[not] have a significant impact on U.S. federalism 
and intergovernmental relations.”28  However, not all scholars agreed. Furthermore, as 
homeland security progressed into an era when terrorism ceased to exist as the sole 
worry, academic considerations shifted to a broader examination of intergovernmental 
relationships. 
Conversely, Peter Eisinger advanced the notion of subnational elements 
not being proactive enough in the new homeland security realm. Written in 2006, 
“Imperfect Federalism” lays out the governmental arrangements after five years of 
posturing and maturation. As he states, “although the prevailing federalism template 
normally predicts a highly decentralized approach to any new concern, states and 
localities did not respond to the challenge of homeland security by proclaiming states’ 
rights … instead states and communities looked to Washington to enlist, lead, and 
support them.”29  But the federal government was not there to lead. Why?  Eisinger 
opines that devolution, or the shifting of power down to the states, was the main culprit of 
deficient federalism. Consequently, when the rigors of homeland security actually 
demanded a centralized response, the American federalism system could not adequately 
meet the new challenges.30  The debate over too much or too little centralization garners 
a significant amount of attention and produces stark divisions. 
One notable voice preaching against over-centralization is Matt Mayer. In 
his 2009 book, Homeland Security and Federalism: Protecting America from Outside the 
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Beltway, Mayer stresses the critical implications of an intrusive federal government in 
homeland security and its negative, long-lasting effects. In advocating a more 
collaborative rather than directive approach, Mayer stresses, “a more constitutional 
distribution of work between the federal government and states and localities must be 
reached. In some areas, the current federal government lead is simply unjustified, 
unsustainable, and constitutionally weakest.”31   
b. Intelligence Matters 
Although the academic dispute over American federalism is a seemingly 
perpetual exercise, framing the discussion within a post-9/11 environment generates 
unique questions, such as how best to proceed with transforming intelligence. Given the 
amount of attention to widespread intelligence failures (e.g., 9/11 Commission Report) 
and subsequent attempts at reform such as the creation of Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI) and Intelligence Sharing Environment (ISE), the default has been to 
turn to the national government to rectify the problems. But, as Mayer argues, even 
though “many experts and pundits scoff at the notion that federalism remains a relevant 
concept, the alternative is continued centralization in Washington, which does not have a 
very impressive record of transformation.”32   
The Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), a bipartisan effort 
assigned to tackle America security dilemmas, advocated an approach that closely 
followed Mayer’s proposal. Offering a seven-decade synopsis of American policy and 
governance structures designed to counter a different kind of enemy, the PNSR State and 
Local Issue Team noted how the Cold War necessitated “a centralized, top-down national 
security state” whereas contemporary homeland security needs “require structures which 
are completely the reverse.”33  Striking the right balance between national security and 
homeland security configurations remains an elusive target despite ten plus years of 
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attempts to figure out the true path. Though Sharon Caudle believes “substantial stability 
exists in national homeland security missions and objectives, as well as in policy and 
operational issues,” the fact remains the U.S. has yet to realize exactly what type of 
control system works best.34  To complicate matters, the domestic intelligence 
requirements of homeland security engender multiple facets of control problems because 
of the varying layers in which it is exercised. 
Given the past transgressions of domestic intelligence abuse in the 
previous century, state initiatives to expand policing powers, increase intelligence 
gathering, and establish a presence within the burgeoning homeland security realm were 
not without risk. Moreover, their spread across the country represented a “stark departure 
from the traditional methods” of federally mandated solutions to domestic intelligence 
needs.35  By expanding their law enforcement presence into nontraditional sectors, states 
began to fill the gaps that national agencies could not reach.   However, that movement 
into gray areas would eventually reach a point requiring federal attention. Despite 
increasing policies and limits emanating from the DHS and DOJ, fusion centers remain 
an example of enhanced federalism, as evidenced by their continued growth and 
inclusion into national strategies. Though some argue the increasing national guidelines 
indicate a “federal intrusion into…traditional  [state] spheres of power,” there remains a 
strong deference by DHS to consistently approach fusion centers as state-run entities 
operating as critical partners to the national homeland security scheme.36  The national 
agencies began to look upon these bodies as more than just gap-fillers or federal stand-
ins; instead, the federal leadership now recognizes them as vital to securing sectors well 
beyond the capability of the federal government.  
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C. THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE 
Though it is impossible to predict the path of American federalism development 
within the homeland security regime, a review of the most recent national high-level 
documents yields a noteworthy trend. Whereas some of the earlier documents made 
ample reference to the concept, and even devoted entire sections to espousing its 
principles, the later strategies and reviews entailed far less attention, as exemplified in the 
2007 Homeland Security Strategy that made just a single mention of the word 
“federalism.”   
The downward trend continued into the Obama administration as well. Federalism 
does not appear by name anywhere in the existing national security strategies, DHS 
QHSR, DHS Bottom Up Review, or the DHS Strategic Plan. Whether or not these 
omissions portend something larger is a fundamental question for the future of homeland 
security. Mayer’s declaration that the “federal government has acted by fiat and mandate 
with nothing more than lip service given to the principle of federalism,” now appears to 
be an understatement.37 
However, the absence of the word “federalism” from national documents does not 
necessarily mean it is a dying model for American governance. In actuality, the concepts 
of homeland security offer tremendous growth potential for advancing state and local 
capabilities. A prime example of these opportunities lies in fusion centers, whose 
relatively recent appearance in the national security structure provides an unprecedented 
challenge to duties previously only held by federal agencies. By examining both their 
compositions and connections, fusion centers reveal themselves to be at the forefront of a 
rising tide of federalism.   
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III. MISSIONS AND STRUCTURES 
The eleven-year evolution of homeland security encompasses more than adjusting 
macro-level, national themes. To be sure, the natural course of clearly federal events, 
ranging from such extraordinary disasters as hurricanes Katrina or Sandy to the normal 
drumbeat of three American presidential elections, significantly altered nationwide 
strategies and responses within the homeland security arena. Today, there is a great 
overlap of national security and homeland security interests, whereby seemingly 
straightforward localized items now hold great import for national decision-makers.   
However, while homeland security maintains an undeniably centralized bent, an 
equally important transformation also has occurred at the state level. Contemporary 
intelligence requirements dictate a need for support by elements far below the usual 
agencies of the national government. Matthew Waxman addresses the end of an 
exclusively national solution by advocating, “harnessing state and local institutions for 
national security is needed to address …challenge[s] for which those institutions are 
much better suited than the federal government could ever be.”38  State fusion centers 
represent the answer to those challenges. Furthermore, the varying missions and 
structures of the individual fusion centers signify advances in federalism.   
American federalism encountered a substantial crossroads on the morning of 
September 11, 2001. Because an unknown and unseen enemy deliberately attacked it on 
its own soil, the nation’s response could easily have been one of an enduring 
centralization of power aimed. Instead, the opposite has occurred. A little more than ten 
years later, the country’s resiliency in self-governance and self-protection manifests itself 
in a heightened amount of state-level capabilities and defenses, not a domineering federal 
government. Of those advances, fusion centers, with their adaptable mission parameters 
and flexible composition, stand as tangible representations of what homeland security and 
domestic intelligence should be. The Aspen Institute captures this sentiment by 
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proclaiming, “this new approach to intelligence—serving local partners’ requirements, 
providing intelligence in areas (such as infrastructure) not previously served by 
intelligence agencies, and disseminating information by new means— reflects a transition 
in how Americans perceive national security.”39  From their inception to their continued 
spread across the nation, the fusion center initiative epitomizes a strengthening in 
federalism. State governments now possess greater means to proactively acquire critical 
security information (criminal and terrorist) as well respond to all types of disasters. 
More importantly, those distinctions now occur under the auspices of a downward trend 
of intrusion by the federal government.   
A. ORIGINS 
From the very beginning, states would have much to say in the nation’s reaction 
to the 9/11 attacks. First, the immediate emergency responses to all three targets fell to 
local officials, including the Pentagon. Second, state and local agencies embarked on law 
enforcement intelligence fusion center initiatives. Because several states took it upon 
themselves to create and employ these bodies without immediate federal government 
support, fusion centers enjoy a certain level of grassroots esteem for emerging within the 
dynamic situation of homeland security’s early years. For instance, California established 
its first fusion center a mere two weeks after 9/11; less than three years later, the Golden 
State operated an intrastate network of four separate centers sustained by state 
taxpayers.40   
The early recognition by state leaders that exigent national security dilemmas 
likely would likely significant local requirements stands as a milestone in federalism. 
Despite the conventional wisdom heralding a greater centralization of power in a national 
crisis, the states led this effort and continue to shape the basic contours of the state-
federal relationship in and through the centers. Although some experts voice concerns the 
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fusion center phenomena was nothing more than a hasty reaction by the states that may 
not stand the test of time, the fact remains that seventy-seven fusion centers have spread 
across the country in subsequent years.41   
B. SHIFT IN MISSIONS, EXPANSION IN FOCUS 
Though the origins of fusion centers clearly centered on a localized response to 
global terrorism, the subsequent decade produced a broadening of priorities and 
responsibilities. The shift in focus did not mean the centers lost sight of their original 
mission; rather the maturation of homeland security overall necessitated an expansion 
beyond their initial concerns. Once the initial shock of 9/11 began to be replaced by a 
long-term outlook, “state and local governments found their footing…[and] were able to 
absorb the new demands of homeland security into the existing mission space found in 
public safety and emergency management.”42  By widening their approach, states 
employed fusion centers, which extended their influence into additional areas of public 
safety, thereby strengthening the power of their respective states. Almost all of today’s 
fusion centers commit the bulk of their resources and efforts to addressing what has 
become known as an “all-hazards” approach to homeland security—instead of serving 
strict counterterrorism requirements.   
The move toward embracing a more ambiguous problem set than just terrorism is 
probably as much related to an upswing in federalism as it is to a dearth of actual attacks 
over the last few years. For one thing, with the terrorism front relatively quiet, at least as 
regards the U.S. homeland, there is increased state attention to the broader concepts of 
natural disaster response, public safety, and emergency management. In light of the 
changing environment, “fewer than 15 percent of fusion centers describe their mission 
solely as addressing terrorist threats.”43  Possibly even more revealing, a recent Senate 
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investigation revealed that despite the federal government continually referring to fusion 
centers as crucial partners in preventing terror attacks, 40 percent of the centers did not 
even include terrorism among their self-described operational concerns.44  Whereas 
counterterrorism carries with it deep-seated national implications, embracing an all-
hazards approach affirms a more state-centric undertaking.   
Moreover, the same Senate report conceded, “the exact missions of individual 
fusion centers are largely beyond the authority of the federal government to determine,” a 
strong indicator that states are able to adjust their priorities continually, based on what 
they need—so they are not necessarily beholden to the dictates of DHS.45  Though the 
Senate report offered substantial criticism on many aspects of fusion center performance, 
its major themes centered on DHS oversight and federal funding accountability. By 
acknowledging the freedoms of states to execute their roles without looking to DHS for 
consent, this recent report further cements federalism as a viable component in the fusion 
center process. This is not to say the national government will relinquish complete 
oversight, but this Senate report offers strong confirmation that states will continue 
maintain the ultimate decision-making authority for their fusion centers. 
States must strike a balance between answering the collective call of national 
homeland security requirements and addressing their own law enforcement urgencies, 
especially given federal funding considerations. The 2008 PNSR alludes to these 
intricacies (and tensions) by revealing instances of “federal displeasure with states using 
fusion center grant funds to expand their centers’ all-hazards capabilities instead of 
narrowly applying them to criminal and intelligence applications.”46   
The realities of homeland security have changed and momentum continues to 
build for the federal government to also embrace an all-hazards approach in lieu of a 
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strictly counterterrorism methodology. For example, the 2010 QHSR proclaimed 
effective American homeland security strategy must now look beyond the prevention of 
such attacks by tackling a much broader array of challenges, including natural disasters 
and other emergencies.47  These sentiments were echoed in the 2010 National Security 
Strategy, which noted, “homeland security traces its roots to traditional and historic 
functions of government and society, such as civil defense, emergency response, [and] 
law enforcement.”48  Taken together, these two national policy documents reinforce 
approaches already being taken by state fusion centers.   That is, they are able to address 
the contemporary needs of homeland security while distancing themselves from an over-
saturation of terrorism commitments.   
These additional assignments, to include emergency management and disaster 
response, fit neatly within federalism mandates because they represent the very essence 
of what state and local leadership must provide their constituents. While fusion centers 
still clearly demonstrate utility in the critically important national mission of 
counterterrorism, their metamorphosis into more of an all-hazards function greatly aids 
the states that house them to meet the evolving challenges of homeland security.   
States are now able to use their fusion centers as more effective tools in the quest 
for greater public safety. As the initial Homeland Security Strategy in 2002 stated, “our 
traditions of federalism and limited government require that organizations outside the 
federal government take the lead in many of these efforts [to secure the homeland].”49  
Because of fusion center evolution, that type of sentiment is now reality, not hollow 
rhetoric. 
C. UNIQUENESS AND NON-STANDARDIZATION 
Because fusion centers are created, organized, and staffed primarily by the 
individual states in which they reside (only Wyoming does not have one), they lack 
uniformity across the nation. Some fusion centers maintain jurisdiction throughout a 
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state’s territory, while some have regional responsibilities within a state; others are more 
limited in scope to a smaller metropolitan area. Some are co-located with fully engaged 
emergency management personnel in their Emergency Operations Centers (EOC). Others 
operate independently with a strict law enforcement intelligence slant. Even the names 
vary. Typically—but not always—centers’ names contain the following words: 
assessment, analysis, intelligence, and coordination, or some combination thereof. There 
simply is no set definition or titles for these units, let alone similar mission orientation. In 
addition, there is significant variation in how the national agencies work with the states. 
Both DHS and FBI have yet to codify how they detail their own representatives to fusion 
centers and what functions they assume within them.50  A one-size-fits-all approach to 
fusion centers simply does not exist, either from the states or the federal government.   
Another example of fusion center variation involves the emerging concept of 
specialization. The growing linkages between the individual fusion centers into more of a 
nationwide network now enable some of the more prominent and capable organizations 
to concentrate on specific tasks. In a similar manner to national-level intelligence 
organizations that focus on specific areas (e.g., National Security Agency (NSA) while 
working together to form a national intelligence community, “the same attribute of 
specialization should be extended to the network of fusion centers.”51  For instance, if 
one of New York’s fusion centers possesses superior analytic knowledge of a regional 
criminal syndicate, it would be appropriate to allow that unit to serve as a major hub of 
information to the rest of interstate fusion center network. Otherwise, each state affected 
by the criminal syndicate would be obliged to reach and sustain an appropriate level of 
familiarity and analysis. With a move toward specialization, fusion centers possessing 
critical expertise help “strengthen, bolster, or intensify the network’s collective 
impact.”52   
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Does this trend toward specialization come with risks? Possibly. Placing greater 
emphasis on some mission areas (and, therefore, some fusion centers) might lead to even 
greater disparity between the states and their homeland security priorities. Nonetheless, 
fusion centers will undoubtedly address the needs of their particular state first and 
foremost. No two fusion centers will look alike, nor should they. 
There is arguably profound strength in this variation. Moreover, the adaptability 
and flexibility to meet emerging requirements boosts the overall value of the multiple 
fusion center constructs. Ultimately, these are state-run facilities, and so they must be 
organized in a manner specifically suited for the particular sub-federal requirements 
necessary in their own corner of the country (i.e., what makes sense for Minnesota might 
not work at all for Maryland). Enabling states to adjust their fusion centers to meet their 
needs prevents a monolithic set of miniaturized national intelligence agencies and 
enhances federalism.   
States must be able to develop their own models to be “scalable and organized 
and managed on a geographic basis.”53  That way, fusion center efforts can effectively 
support the needs of their states while simultaneously integrating into the wider homeland 
security mission. If the opposite held true and fusion centers instead fell under rigid DHS 
guidelines, “too much standardization might undermine the advantages of 
experimentation and tailoring to conditions that come with local autonomy.”54   
D. LINKING EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE 
One of the more intriguing aspects of fusion centers and federalism remains the 
capacity for a state to tailor its own approach to homeland security using pre-existing 
agencies under its direction. Because the homeland security evolution continues to trend 
toward an all-hazards approach dealing with potential disasters of all types, not just 
terror-related incidents, there is a growing tendency to link domestic intelligence and 
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emergency management. As a result, some states are incorporating their EOCs with their 
fusion centers. Although EOCs and fusion centers each possess unique responsibilities 
and capabilities, their overlapping intelligence and operational duties to public safety 
warrant colocation and/or increased coordination. DHS recognizes that fusion centers 
“are uniquely situated to empower front-line law enforcement, public safety, fire service, 
emergency response, public health, critical infrastructure protection, and private sector 
security personnel.”55   
Fusion centers and EOCs each have skill sets and tools at their disposals to 
accomplish their individually assigned missions, but a significant amount of overlap 
exists to enhance the other’s effectiveness. This commonality leads to increased 
cooperation and, as the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act 
recommended, an overall process that fosters a “collaborative environment” between the 
seemingly disparate public safety efforts.56  Some, but not all, states took those proposals 
onboard. For example, a 2011 DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report 
addressing Fusion Center and EOC relationships noted the employment of fusion 
intelligence tools to mitigate a natural disaster; likewise, another state utilized its 
emergency management capabilities to provided local situational awareness to a fusion 
center.57  
Developing the relationships between emergency management and fusion center 
intelligence makes perfect sense. After all, the initial moments following a disaster are 
chaotic and confusing regardless if it is terror-related. Additionally, recovery from any 
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type of disaster will include common operations that require close coordination between 
all aspects of public safety: law enforcement and emergency response. However, not all 
states are willing incorporate EOCs into their fusion systems. Some resist because of the 
sensitivities about potentially mixing intelligence with un-cleared personnel without a 
need to know.   
Whether states employ an all-crimes or all-hazards fusion center methodology 
could have significant consequences for its citizens when an emergency situation occurs. 
The DHS OIG Report advocated that “although a fusion center can adopt either approach 
for its operations, the all-crimes approach may sever part of the link between 
preparedness and response, a link that is critical to protecting American lives.”58  Those 
states that embrace combining their emergency management and fusion processes wind 
up possessing enhanced homeland security capabilities. By leveraging response efforts 
with intelligence initiatives, a combined fusion center/EOC relationship provides a state 
with the opportunity to fully take charge instead of relying on federal government 
intervention.   
If states take it one step further and induce neighboring states to adopt like-
minded approaches about fusion centers and EOCs, resources and expertise can be 
further pooled. The concept of regionalism thus produces “economies of 
scale…ensuring…effective emergency responses…that transcend traditional 
jurisdictional boundaries;” a concept made even more valid by the fact that disasters can 
be widespread affairs spilling over the borders of individual states.59   
E. DRAWBACKS OF VARIATION 
The missions and structures of state fusion centers vary as much as the distinct 
identities of the fifty states. But the lack of uniformity comes with a potentially 
significant price. From a watchdog perspective, the arbitrary arrangement and purpose of 
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these fusion centers inhibits an effective performance appraisal, or a true calculation of 
whether or not they hold enough value for the American people.60  Though states bear the 
final responsibility for molding these units as they see fit, the absence of a standardized 
framework raises questions as to how effectively they plug in to the national scheme. For 
instance, the federal government views fusion centers as critical elements in the struggle 
against thwarting future terror attacks, but can only offer non-mandatory guidelines and 
best practices. Concerns also exist about how the lack of uniformity may impinge the 
dispersal of information. For example, a CRS Report lamented how the absence of a 
common fusion center organization might result in channeling any products down into a 
narrower audience instead of promulgating them outward.61   
Yet another negative element of fusion center variation involves the wide range of 
individual staff members serving in their functional capacities. Because a singular 
staffing chart for all fusion centers does not exist, “employees often occupy multiple 
organizational roles (e.g., police officers or National Guard members and fusion center 
analysts), which can lead to an understandable, but nonetheless problematic, blurring of 
professional identities, rules of conduct, and systems of accountability.”62  Additionally, 
the mélange of personnel from different organizations leads to “mismatched security 
clearances and ambiguous understandings” that can lead to a contamination of 
intelligence or, at the very least, an inefficient work environment.63   
Does the diverse nature of fusion centers present potential issues for homeland 
security initiatives? Yes. The absence of standardization from one state to the other may 
reduce effectiveness in implementing some of the mission areas touted by the national 
government. However, from a federalism perspective, the individuality exhibited by the 
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different fusion centers does not lessen state capabilities. By prominently demonstrating 
uniqueness within an overarching national strategy, states have re-established their 
standing while still being capable partners with the federal level. 
F. DECENTRALIZATION AND HOMELAND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE 
Although the lack of uniformity may be perceived as but another example of 
government inefficiency, these fusion centers remain ideal representations of American 
federalism. The prerogative of states to construct them as needed and tailor their 
operational commitments to meet local concerns highlights the powers delineated in the 
Constitution. While the failure of state law enforcement entities to coalesce into a 
modular apparatus appears as a weakness to some, it is instead a matter of strength and 
keeping in line with time-honored tendencies. As Matthew Waxman declared, 
“harnessing police agencies for a national security agenda creates difficult organizational 
challenges, magnified by the resilience of U.S. policing’s decentralization and 
heterogeneity.”64 
This decentralization forms an integral concept in homeland security and 
federalism that became evident immediately after the attacks. Some quickly recognized 
the need for states to act on their own following 9/11 because the “adoption of standard, 
rational, hierarchical designs and practices is likely to be particularly unsuitable for 
organizations that are expected to operate in complex, unstable environments…more 
unstable environments create a need for greater decentralization of authority and less 
emphasis on formal structure.”65  The federal government simply could not step in and 
fill all of the homeland security requirements from the top down, nor could it quickly and 
efficiently organize the states to help themselves.   
In the absence of hierarchy, states formulated a “decentralized and organically 
developed network” of fusion centers that, in turn, grew into “a national asset, [whose] 
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sustainment…is a shared responsibility across all levels of government.”66  As a result of 
the individual states’ efforts to construct these fusion centers, the overall national 
homeland security capability received a much-needed boost in capability. Of course, the 
dilemmas of homeland security cannot be solved with a stand-alone confederation of 
these state-run bodies. The complexities of the new security requirements will ultimately 
require multiple networks, not a singular network to meet the challenges of the multi-
dimensional requirements.67 
The concept of decentralization not only feeds into the discussion concerning 
fusion centers, but also into the evolving topic of the broad-based homeland security 
intelligence, or HSINT. The same inherent difficulties that preclude precisely defining 
homeland security itself also impede constructing a complete description of HSINT, as 
evidenced by how some experts view the terms domestic intelligence and homeland 
security intelligence as merely being interchangeable, even conversational in nature.68  
Instead of a widely accepted accounting of its meaning prevailing, the word HSINT is 
loosely thrown around to meet the requirements of the description at hand. Although 
arguments abound that by maintaining such a vague definition, those involved with 
producing HSINT remain hamstrung and muzzled, the opposite is actually true.69   
To be certain, the confusion over narrowly defined parameters may be somewhat 
frustrating, but it does not necessarily hamper fusion center efforts. In fact, one particular 
HSINT concept “envision[s] a less hierarchical or a more decentralized 
structure…[where] state, local, and private sector organizations have taken on a more 
activist role that includes collecting their own intelligence while working with federal law 
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enforcement and IC partners.”70  The dispersal of such organizations throughout the 
different levels of government plays to the strengths of federalism and, subsequently, to 
the gathering and deciphering of HSINT. Since the bodies responsible for conducting 
vital threat analysis already consist of widely diffused skillsets spread out over large 
geographic areas, attempts to consolidate and centralize would likely undercut the 
inherent advantages enjoyed from the seventy plus fusion centers currently operating 
under the purview of the states.71  Rigid definitions and monolithic organizational 
structures do not equip any level of leadership (federal, state, or local) with the essential 
tools necessary for confronting homeland security challenges.   
G. MONEY MATTERS 
The missions and structures of fusion centers repeatedly demonstrate the rise of 
state capabilities within homeland security. The skillful execution of assigned tasks and 
the proper manning of these components help validate the need for states to absorb more 
and more national security responsibilities. However, the final question really is the 
bottom line: who is paying for it?  One of the primary means of determining who holds 
the power is determining who holds the purse. It is no different for fusion centers. Stuck 
in the middle between competing governmental priorities, a belief exists that “while 
fusion centers are not federal entities and have no federal legal status, they are a central 
element of homeland security policy and receive substantial federal support and 
guidance.”72  This begs the question of whether a reliance on homeland security grant 
monies equates into a diminishment of federalism. But here again, the uniqueness and 
non-standardization of fusion centers precludes being trampled upon by an over-
influential national government because there simply is no codified financial arrangement 
for the state agencies. Case in point, a survey of fusion center resources revealed the 
proportion of federal dollars ranged from 0 to 100 percent of the total operating funds; 
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moreover, the average hovered around 30 percent while the median stood at just 21 
percent.73  With that much variation in federal spending, it is hard to conceive of the 
states being collectively influenced by DHS lines of accounting. 
Nonetheless, in the event of an across-the-board reduction in federal fusion center 
expenditures, some will be forced to close (or consolidate) because it is highly unlikely 
state funding will always be redirected to keep fusion centers operating at their current 
levels. To combat this issue against the backdrop of an increasingly tighter fiscal outlook, 
states are now exploring future sustainment measures, but they still need consistent 
federal funding to accomplish those goals.74  Fusion center advocates recognize the 
looming danger of uncertain budgets and point to federal dollars as being the key in 
keeping the National Network of Fusion Centers active in the homeland security realm.75  
But does this equate to a dependency from DHS and, furthermore, does this constitute a 
threat to the federalism advances since 2001?  As scholars noted shortly after 9/11 when 
homeland security dollars flowed freely down to the states, “a greater degree of financial 
assistance will most likely involve a greater degree of federal policy and regulatory 
prescription of activities that previously were left almost wholly to state and local 
governments.”76   
While one may perceive the large allotments to state homeland security efforts as 
predisposing them to federal subservience, the wholesale fiscal accountability of DHS 
speaks otherwise. Although overall DHS funding and oversight is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, the agency’s bungling of fusion center budgeting supervision gives credence 
to the notion that states have been somewhat free to do what they want with the money 
and avoid narrowly-defined parameters. In a particularly critical Senate report from 2012 
addressing the national government’s involvement with state fusion centers, “the 
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investigation found that DHS did not know with any accuracy how much grant money it 
has spent on specific fusion centers, nor could it say how most of those grant funds were 
spent, nor has it examined the effectiveness of those grant dollars;” furthermore, the 
estimates of total expenditures range from just under $300 million to almost $1.5 
billion.77  Accordingly, this staggering lack of accountability from DHS lessens the 
potential to characterize DHS fusion center funding as intruding on federalism. If 
anything, conventional wisdom dictates that states astutely utilized what was provided to 
them and advanced their own initiatives.  
H. CONCLUSION 
Before 9/11, little attention was paid to domestic intelligence, or even the concept 
of “homeland security.”  The mere mention of an inward-looking security apparatus 
elicited grave concerns about the U.S. morphing into an undesirable police state, or 
resuscitated lingering memories of civil liberties abuses at the hands of the FBI and the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). But fast-forward a decade later and the nation now 
operates an expansive intelligence-gathering framework designed to prevent the next 
attack. While some elements still maintain a watchdog perspective and repeatedly caution 
against government over-intrusion into innocent people’s lives, the vast majority accept 
the measures executed by FBI, DHS, and other homeland security elements. So what 
changed and why? 
Arguably, the roles assumed by non-federal authorities, namely state fusion 
centers, help assuage the fears of those apprehensive about living under the watchful eye 
of the government. When viewed through a constitutional lens, fusion center 
development and proliferation represent a re-assertion of American federalism because 
they demonstrate an increased accumulation of power available to the states. Two of the 
most important elements of this upswing in federalism result from the missions and 
structures of fusion centers. The decentralized nature of the overall homeland security 
apparatus as well as the growing numbers of vital national mission areas enables state 
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fusion centers to rise in stature. Because each state is free to tailor their own agencies to 
meet the needs of their constituents, fusion centers enjoy the kind of flexibility urgently 
needed in today’s domestic security environment. Properly outfitting and configuring 
these components, as the states have done in tweaking the seventy-plus existing models, 
pays off immensely when conducting operations in the most challenging security 
ecosystem of all: the information sharing environment. 
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IV. NETWORKING THE INTELLIGENCE 
In the spring of 2002, the Markle Foundation Task Force, consisting of leading 
American national security experts, released a report titled “Protecting America’s 
Freedom in the Information Age” on the consequences of embryonic communication 
technologies. Though homeland security was then in its infancy, the prospects of 
executing critical, nation-protecting defensive tasks within an increasingly globally 
connected world loomed large. Traditional hierarchical communication methodologies 
were quickly being overtaken by new systems that benefitted from “dynamic 
connections…across levels of an information community…[whose] directories and data 
repositories are frequently distributed and dispersed.”78  The remarkable expansion in 
global communication held great promise for unprecedented relationships between 
heretofore inaccessible partners. But with this potential for advances came equally 
significant concerns for new hazards. As with changing information technologies, the 
Markle Report envisioned “the threats to national security [becoming] decentralized, 
networked, and dynamic.”79  To counter al Qaeda and other groups, the United States 
faced a dilemma: how to construct and/or rearrange existing national security capacities 
within the fundamental guidelines of American democracy while, at the same time, 
preserving the treasured liberties. 
The Constitution’s Fourth Amendment not only protects Americans from 
unlawful searches and seizures, but also mandates a valid warrant be served based on 
probable cause of wrongdoing. But with fusion centers, the threshold drops down to 
merely “suspicious behavior.”  As a Congressional Research Report (CRS) indicates, 
“arguments against fusion centers often center around the idea that such centers are 
essentially pre-emptive law enforcement—that intelligence gathered in the absence of a 
criminal predicate is unlawfully gathered intelligence…[and] the greater the chances that 
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civil liberties may be violated.”80  The same report also recognized that fusion centers 
expand their information sources “beyond criminal intelligence, to include federal [i.e., 
“national”] intelligence, as well as public and private sector data.”81  Does this finding 
mean fusion centers function exclusively on questionably obtained intelligence that 
consistently violates the Fourth Amendment? No, of course not. However, the potential 
does and will continue to exist until the country acquires a greater understanding of them 
operating in an often murky security environment where state and federal priorities 
merge. 
As James Baker stated, “the Constitution rarely answers the national security 
question; rather, it provides each generation the procedural means to do so.”82  Arguably, 
the answer to the dilemma of global connections and national security over the last 
decade emanates from the concept of federalism. In other words, one of the oldest 
principles of American governance is successfully poised to exploit some of the newest 
technologies. The dispersal of intelligence production through far-flung state fusion 
centers offers remarkable opportunities to attain homeland security requirements. The 
heightened roles of states to acquire, analyze, and disseminate crucial intelligence 
products used by national leadership point to a growth in sub-federal power. The previous 
way of providing for national security employed heavy restrictions on the availability of 
classified information, even within the federal level of government. The lessons learned 
from the mistakes in 2001 made it very clear that barriers to intelligence-sharing needed 
to change.   
A. BARRIER REMOVAL: STATE ACCESS TO THE FEDERAL COOKIE 
JAR 
Before 9/11, national-level intelligence information flowing from the federal 
government to the states amounted to very little of what occurs today. The reason for this 
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stemmed from Cold War dictates about clear lines between domestic and foreign defense 
requirements, as well as the civil liberties anxieties of the preceding decades. However, 
once the threats blurred distinctions between overseas and domestic responsibilities, 
states actively sought a greater role. Subsequently, they developed fusion centers to 
tackle what they perceived to be was a demonstrable lack of adequate terrorism 
information sharing from the federal government.83  Moreover, experts began to question 
“the efficiency and effectiveness of federal homeland security efforts” if the nation failed 
to engage those state and local bodies, especially given the advantages they possessed in 
traditional law enforcement capacities that now had complete relevance in federal 
counterterrorism efforts.84   
To overcome these shortcomings, many began to advocate a comprehensive, 
national effort to distribute more homeland security intelligence more broadly and more 
quickly. To be sure, the 9/11 Commission addressed the need for greater information 
distribution between components of the FBI and CIA, but it only briefly alluded to 
increased participation by state and local forces. Finally, after two pieces of landmark 
legislation (the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and 
Implementing Recommendations of 9/11 Commission Act of 2007) laid the initial 
groundwork, the Bush Administration released a 2007 National Strategy for Information 
Sharing that delineated roles and responsibilities for a wide-ranging set of government 
components, including state and local fusion centers. The policy also pronounced that the 
evolving model of information sharing would be inextricably linked with other 
foundational security concepts including: the National Security Strategy, National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism, National Strategy for Homeland Security, and 
National Intelligence Strategy.85  By affirming the significance of information sharing 
within its vital national strategies, the federal government paved the way for 
advancements in state capacities. 
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For fusion centers, the new policy was important because “it declared for the first 
time that state and local governments should be treated as full and trusted partners with 
the federal government in our nation’s efforts to combat terrorism.”86  Thus recognized 
and empowered, states demanded and received access to intelligence and information 
databases previously open only within the circles of the federal government; now state 
law enforcement and public safety officials gained unparalleled access to critically 
important classified information. The FBI considers this growing trend of fusion center 
integration to be “the broadest dissemination of secret information in the nation’s 
history.”87  According to a 2011 survey by the National Fusion Center Association, 
nearly 90 percent of its member agencies “had access, either within the fusion center or 
on-site, to classified systems through which the Federal Government disseminates time-
sensitive information and intelligence products.”88   
The National Strategy for Information Sharing specifically pointed out state 
fusion centers as vitally important to fulfilling its mission and proclaimed them to be the 
primary node for terrorism-related information flowing down from the federal 
government. In addition, it addressed the need to “respect” federalism and iterated that, 
“unless specifically prohibited by law, or subject to security classification restrictions, 
these fusion centers may further customize [national terrorism intelligence] for 
dissemination to satisfy intra- or inter-State needs.”89   
In some ways, the availability of classified material holds substantial promise in 
advancing federalism. Whereas state and local agencies once confined themselves to law 
enforcement databases in the quest for public safety, the opportunity to consume national 
intelligence information now renders them with greater capabilities to meet their larger 
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public safety and security requirements. To be certain, this new information-sharing 
realm does have the potential to diminish, not enhance federalism. Federal agencies still 
have the final say which intelligence can be disseminated down to the state level and can 
restrict state participation in sensitive investigations. Because the concept is still under 
development, the outcome for federalism is far from being decided. However, the 
momentum gained from repetitive inclusion of the states in the overall homeland security 
process indicates a positive trend for federalism. 
B. NO SILENT PARTNERS: STATE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION 
Being increasingly connected to federal agencies and intelligence networks 
clearly enhances state capabilities. However, to become truly effective partners in 
homeland security, states must also bring information into the system. In terms of 
attaining greater intelligence success, it is just as much about the “push” as it is the “pull” 
and the thousands of state and local law enforcement officials serve to feed the network. 
1. Digging up the Dirt 
Fusion centers operate as producers of intelligence, not just consumers: state and 
local officers acquire potentially nationally relevant reports and maintain the ability to 
promulgate them throughout the larger homeland security apparatus. The movement to a 
more robust information-sharing process also strengthens the roles of the states because 
the information spreads out among all levels government instead of remaining behind the 
federal “wall” inaccessible to the individual states. In so doing, states can now routinely 
demonstrate their growing importance in the overall scheme of national security by 
taking advantage of the two-way flow of intelligence. As James Burch stipulates, 
“information sharing should include the proactive sharing of both finished 
intelligence…and raw data…[however,] this is a significant and fundamental paradigm 
shift for the intelligence community, where control of sources, methods, and raw data 
translates into power.”90  Because fusion centers are evolving in an era that places a  
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higher emphasis on sharing, rather than protecting information, their standard operating 
procedures reflect an increased willingness of officials to distribute critical data to 
others.91   
Although state and local authorities will not likely see the most highly classified 
national intelligence, the inclusion of fusion centers within the expanding system of 
information sharing indicates great potential to cement their status as critical nodes. 
Rather than being relegated to receiving highly filtered or fragmented information, states 
instead operate as valuable partners possessing critical analytic and collection 
competencies. The National Governors Association highlighted these emerging skillsets 
when it acknowledged that, “the proper collection, analysis, and dissemination of 
information and intelligence at the state and local levels will enhance the capabilities 
required at the regional and national levels to better connect the dots and disrupt criminal 
and terrorist acts.”92  
One of the most cited examples of successful fusion center integration involved 
the terror plot of Najibullah Zazi in 2009 when the efforts of a Colorado fusion center 
enabled authorities to thwart a potentially disastrous attack on New York City’s subway 
system. Although a 2012 Senate report attempted to downplay the fusion center’s 
contributions in preventing the attack, the director of the FBI’s Denver field office at the 
time of the investigation praised the fusion center as being vitally important because of 
the unique capabilities it possessed.93 
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2. Federal Encouragement 
A recent Senate report urged DHS to expand its connection to fusion centers and 
demonstrate a more robust consumption of state and local intelligence.94  The reason for 
this is simply a numbers game. The widespread accumulation of homeland security-
related data would overwhelm federal authorities and invariably lead to potentially 
serious omissions without the involvement of extra personnel. Instead, “state and local 
fusion center analysts conduct assessments and produce intelligence products…that 
otherwise would not be addressed by federal authorities.”95  The ability of these state-run 
entities to acquire, analyze, and disseminate nationally pertinent intelligence makes them 
a valuable commodity for homeland security efforts because they substantially extend the 
reach of government. The ultimate payoff for this type of arrangement comes in the form 
of a markedly improved intelligence distribution up and down the different levels of 
government.   
Moreover, the information flow is not only vertical, but horizontal as well, when 
critical pieces of intelligence move in from, and out to, the more distant components of 
the homeland security apparatus. A decade of coordinated, nationwide information 
sharing efforts now enables all elements charged with ensuring America’s security “to 
function in hubs and spokes and distributed networks, empowering people at the edges of 
agencies instead of working in hierarchical pyramids.”96   
Arguably, this hub-and-spoke arrangement also enables “diagonal” information 
sharing because a fusion center operating in one state now has the capacity to inform a 
DHS representative in another. A prime example of this arrangement arose from the 
Goose Creek incident in 2007 when rapid exchanges of information between Florida, 
South Carolina, North Carolina, the DHS National Operations Center (NOC), two FBI 
                                                 
94 Federal Support for Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers: Senate Majority and Minority 
Staff Report, 14. 
95 Justin L. Abold, Ray Guidetti, and Douglas Keyer, “Strengthening the Value of the National 
Network of Fusion Centers by Leveraging Specialization,” 4. 
96 U.S. Congress. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Ten Years 
After 9/11: A Status Report On Information Sharing (statement of Zoe Baird Budinger and Jeffrey H. 
Smith), 112th Congress, October 12, 2011, 4. 
 44
JTTFs, and a Coast Guard-led maritime security task force resulted in the arrest and 
indictment of two Egyptian nationals.97  To be sure, Goose Creek is one of the more 
notable occurrences of using network capabilities to speed response times among 
disparate agencies; the overwhelming majority of homeland security interactions between 
the levels of government continues to be mundane and routine. However, this everyday 
aspect of interaction does not lessen the importance of states being plugged into the 
national network. If anything, it attests to the normality of the arrangement – and the 
centrality of the states in it. 
In addition, as technological efforts yield greater access for states, the reverse is 
also true: federal agencies can easily see down into state-level information. With the 
development of the National Data Exchange (N-DEx), a system now exists that 
“enabl[es] federal law enforcement, counterterrorism and intelligence analysts to 
automatically examine the enormous caches of local and state records for the first 
time.”98  The improved access and sharing efforts being developed for homeland security 
ultimately benefits all components, no matter what level of government. As of its 2010 
Increment 3 debut, N-DEx incorporated 200,000 users sharing such routine, low-level 
law enforcement information as traffic citations and dispatch calls within a “repository of 
criminal justice records, available in a secure online environment, managed by the 
FBI.”99  Even though the data that passes through N-DEx can only be categorized as 
criminal justice material, it is not hard to imagine taking advantage of this system for 
domestic intelligence purposes. It certainly signifies a steady advancement in federalism 
because the national government understands the value of locally produced information 
within the broader task of homeland security. 
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C. GOOD NEIGHBORS: OLD-FASHIONED NETWORKING 
Although one of the first things that comes to mind when using the word 
“network” involves electronic databases and enhanced connectivity with widely 
dispersed units, a more human approach also exists that should not be discounted. 
Effective employment of this growing national communication system still relies heavily 
on the day-to-day interactions between the people who stand the watch. 
1. Building Relationships 
Fusion centers enhance state power not only from utilizing advances in 
technological networking, but from the more traditional means of interpersonal 
networking as well. In addition to acquiring unprecedented federal database access, 
fusion centers “also break down bureaucratic barriers by assigning employees of these 
government entities to shared physical workspaces, often leasing space in the same 
buildings as FBI field offices.”100  In this case, the physical interface between partners 
matters as much as the flow of information between the organizations. From a practical 
standpoint, co-locating fusion centers near federal law enforcement and DHS offices 
remains a more logical arrangement than blindly communicating with each other over 
computer, telephone, or via infrequent meetings. The more comfortable the fusion centers 
are working together with their federal counterparts (and vice-versa), the less chance of 
substantial miscommunication or misidentification of a critical piece of intelligence. 
Adequately developing positive and habitual state-federal homeland security 
relationships improves the overall effectiveness for each level.   
Furthermore, this interaction should go beyond the cursory detailing of federal 
agents to fusion centers.101  While maintaining individual federal liaison officers within 
the construct of state fusion centers continues to improve intelligence sharing, it is the 
true networking through pervasive organizational cooperation that provides the greatest 
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opportunities for enhancing state capability. As a result, states benefit immensely from 
this type of sustained closeness to federal expertise.   
More importantly, maximizing state-local-federal interoperability can help 
alleviate organizational biases that might otherwise stymie intelligence efforts. Because 
“people are naturally prone to gravitate towards and give more information to members 
of their own organization and less information to outsiders,” strengthening professional 
relationships through increased co-location and collaboration offers significant 
advantages for homeland security efforts.102  The mutual support derived from operating 
in close proximity to one another remains a positive by-product of fusion center 
development. 
2. Resistance to Cooperation 
However, some critics view the increased cooperation of local law enforcement 
centers with federal officials as a potentially dangerous arrangement that could yield 
greater state subservience instead of autonomy. Instead of enhancing state and local 
power, the amplified collaboration with national agencies might further blur the lines 
resulting in non-federal bodies becoming subsumed within DHS and FBI initiatives, thus 
raising fundamental questions about civil liberties and the roles played by police forces.   
In one notable instance of local resistance to national initiatives, the city of 
Portland, OR, rescinded its police association with the area’s JTTF in 2005 because of 
perceived oversight and security clearance issues. The city’s determination to distance 
itself from the JTTF originated from a rising sentiment of its law enforcement efforts 
being commandeered by national agencies. This self-imposed separation from the JTTF 
lasted until 2011 when, following the FBI’s revelation of a terrorism plot within the city, 
Portland officials hastily re-engineered their cooperation with the federal government to 
                                                 
102 Joseph W. Pfeifer, “Network Fusion: Information and Intelligence Sharing for a Networked 
World,” Homeland Security Affairs Vol. 8, No. 17, (October 2012) http://www.hsaj.org/?article=8.1.17, 7. 
 47
avoid repeating the mistake of being left out of the loop in the investigation.103  
Portland’s reassessment of the security situation demonstrates that although sub-federal 
entities maintain their inherent sovereignty to execute public safety measures as they see 
fit, the benefits of operating within a mutually supporting intelligence apparatus outweigh 
the costs of what some perceive to be aggressive federal encroachment. 
Despite this case, the overwhelming trend is one of greater integration of law 
enforcement elements between the various levels of government. Retaining police 
independence may appeal to certain elements of the population, but the nature of 
homeland security necessitates greater state and local contributions, thereby heightening 
federalism. The joint nature of the security arrangement produces advantages for all 
levels. 
D. FRINGE BENEFITS: NON-TERRORISM SUCCESSES 
In all likelihood, fusion center development would not have occurred without the 
2001 attacks on U.S. soil. However, these agencies perform many other critical functions 
other than counterterrorism. The roles they perform as public safety components help 
further validate the need for these bodies. 
1. Crime and Security 
Expanding state and local involvement with federal authorities unquestionably 
augments the overall national homeland security mission; concurrently, those same 
municipalities reap additional benefits for themselves as a result from participating in the 
post-9/11 information sharing structure. This is not to say non-federal ISE elements  
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operate primarily for their own needs, but working within the system provides substantial 
opportunities for achieving successes that are not specifically attributable to homeland 
security mission areas.   
Acutely aware of the requirements faced by its valuable non-federal participants, 
the National Strategy for Information Sharing “recognizes the sovereignty of State and 
local governments…[and fusion center] incorporation into the ISE takes into account that 
these centers support day-to-day crime control efforts and other critical public safety 
activities.”104  Maintaining the proper balance of effort between national and local 
security requirements can place added stress on a system largely constructed under the 
threat of terrorism, but one that is almost entirely run by those who maintain an absolute 
obligation to protect their own constituents against normal crimes and hazards.105    
However, despite the potential for what may be perceived as a conflict in 
choosing between homeland or local security, states can actually use the burgeoning 
national network to enhance both fights. A RAND Corporation survey of state and local 
authorities outlined just such a possibility when it summarized the newer emphasis on 
counterterrorism intelligence efforts as a means to also reinforce traditional law 
enforcement capabilities. According to the survey’s respondents, “on the one hand, 
municipalities consistently report that they are redirecting traditional crime-control 
resources to support homeland security missions. On the other hand…the possibility 
[exists] that counterterrorism intelligence activities may hold the promise of 
increasing…effectiveness against [serious] crime…by building skills that are critical to 
confronting such problems.”106   
In essence, by assigning a national task of counterterrorism to state and local 
authorities, the U.S. government provides ample opportunities to expand federalism by 
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elevating state competencies in a multitude of arenas, not the least of which is basic 
public safety within their jurisdictions. Long-time fusion center advocate and leading law 
enforcement figure, William Bratton, refers to these bodies as “centers of gravity” in the 
struggle against both crime and terrorism, an apt description of the multiple threat 
responsibilities they face.107  What may appear on the surface as forced compliance to 
national security efforts instead presents local officials with expanded opportunities of 
asserting control while providing increased protection against any number of hazards. 
Including states into the national network does not mean they are absorbed. In practice, 
and for the conceivable future of homeland security, the opposite is true.  
2. Networking Disasters 
While state and local participation in the national information-sharing network 
provides them with numerous advantages in preventing crime and terrorism, the 
aggressive utilization of the fusion concept also offers inherent advantages in other vital 
homeland security mission areas. For example, one of the key components of homeland 
security addressed by the QHSR focuses on disaster resiliency.108  The capacity to 
rebound from what would otherwise be devastating circumstances depends, in large part, 
on a robust, interconnected system enabling the free-flow of information between the 
vital components of society. Without the movement of crucial data, authorities on all 
levels would operate in isolated bubbles and risk wasting time and effort executing 
uncoordinated responses, possibly exacerbating already dangerous situations.   
To combat this inefficiency, fusion centers stand as proven models of integrated 
networking because they already “connect to a diverse group of agencies to share 
intelligence and information not only for prevention and protection, but also for 
mitigation, response, and recovery.”109  Although prevention and protection remain 
critically important, it is impossible to conceive of a future without disasters, either 
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manmade or natural. Therefore, substantial effort must be put into determining what will 
happen after something does go wrong or, in the case of mitigation, taking measures now 
to lessen future impacts. As such, state fusion centers provide the technologically 
integrated tools necessary to accomplish those tasks that occur after disasters strike 
because they already operate within a system that places great emphasis on acquiring, 
processing, and sharing data before they occur.   
Increasing fusion center disaster-related involvement with such varied public 
safety components as emergency management, health providers, first responders, private 
businesses, and law enforcement elements helps reinforce the notion that states are now 
elevating and standardizing their overall disaster response capabilities. By solidifying 
these relationships while simultaneously employing emerging data networks, states are 
now in the position to “help cement the long-term value and viability of the fusion 
centers in support of emergency management.”110  In other words, state and local 
authorities can tap into the pre-existing framework of the intelligence-centric network to 
link up with other fusion centers and pool disaster-related resources or knowledge; 
consequently, the non-federal levels of American government demonstrate increased 
powers to provide for its citizens. Because the emerging data fusion and networking 
concepts offer unprecedented opportunities to coordinate previously disconnected 
government elements, the overall reach and strength of states enjoy a significant boost. 
Although the information-sharing concept emphasizes effectively managing homeland 
security intelligence focused on terrorism, the opportunity for states to exploit the 
network capabilities for critical public safety missions offers great potential for 
heightening federalism.   
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E. INFORMATION OVERLOAD: DO ALL THE PIECES FIT? 
The emergence of collaborative and distributive information systems offers ample 
opportunities for the homeland security “enterprise” to become more efficient, as well as 
more effective. However, there are some dark sides to implementing these technologies.    
For one thing, in the years after 9/11, the race to remedy the well-known 
intelligence sharing shortfalls invariably led to an overabundance of competing systems. 
As the government scrambled to correct the fatal flaws that led to the attacks, the 
emerging databases unfortunately exhibited redundant and overlapping characteristics. 
For example, a 2006 Justice Research and Statistics Association (JRSA) survey 
discovered 266 independent systems for sharing crime and terrorism information either 
already in existence or in various stages of development.111  What started out as 
aggressive problem solving to break down the intelligence “wall” now has the potential 
to create a new issue: overloading the analysts with information. A common analogy to 
this situation is when an individual searches on Google about a breaking news story. 
Oftentimes dozens or hundreds of “hits” may appear. The long list may indicate a 
significant incident, but in reality, it more accurately reflects the various press agencies 
simply repeating each other to produce an exorbitant amount of words on the same topic.   
However, in a homeland security scenario, the danger lies not only in too much 
data being regurgitated by dissimilar systems, but the lack of integration between the 
systems. The former Inspector General for DHS, Richard L. Skinner, testified before 
Congress in July 2012 that the “Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) and the 
Homeland Security State and Local Community of Interest (HSLIC) systems, both 
developed by DHS, are not integrated…[and], as a result, users must maintain separate 
accounts, and information cannot easily be shared across the systems.”112  Suffice to say, 
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this disjointed networking effort yields frustrations for state fusion centers that rely on 
being intertwined within the national framework of homeland security actors.  
The results are startling: over the course of an 18 month period in 2009–2010, an 
average of 49 percent of state and local officials with access to the HS SLIC actually 
logged into the system; instead, the DHS OIG reports that “e-mail and phone calls remain 
the primary methods for sharing information with fusion centers.”113  Despite the 
tremendous exertion in creating a seamless set of technologically-advanced information 
sharing regimes, state and local practitioners of homeland security more often than not 
end up relying on e-mails and telephones from their federal counterparts. From a 
federalism perspective, this type of reliance potentially lessens the power of the states by 
making them more beholden to the national level agencies to provide the critical pieces of 
intelligence. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Although the redundant and overlapping networks possess many negative 
attributes, their great potential in changing the way the U.S. tackles its homeland security 
issues far outweighs the drawbacks. The system is not perfect because there will always 
be a greater amount of intelligence than can possibly be processed by those entrusted 
with doing so; furthermore, key pieces of data will inevitably become hidden under the 
layers and in the nooks of these networks. Additionally, some analysts and components 
will find it easier to function without heavy reliance on intricate databases, preferring 
instead to perform their roles in a more traditional context.   
Nevertheless, the decade-plus evolution of homeland security produced dramatic 
advances in how the U.S. defends itself, highlighted by the monumental upswing in 
information sharing capabilities. Now, as the homeland security initiative continues to 
mature, the government must capitalize on what it has already created. Whereas the  
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immediate aftermath of 9/11 spurred heavy investment in establishing the frameworks of 
the various networks, the Markle Foundation forecasts the next step will be ensuring 
“informal and flexible groups from different parts of government and the private sector 
[are able] to work together on the full range of crosscutting issues to share expertise—as 
they do for counterterrorism.”114 Plugging states and localities into this nationwide 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Without question, the surge of national government intervention after 9/11 was 
expected—and welcomed. Exemplified by such efforts as stationing troops at airport 
security checkpoints or positioning jet fighters into combat air patrols in the skies 
overhead, the federal government took extraordinary measures to insert itself into as 
many places as possible in the hopes of deterring the next attack. Moreover, the inception 
of DHS in early 2003 produced yet another bureaucratic layer in the quest to defend the 
homeland and resulted in billions of further expenditures. As Matthew Brzezinski noted 
in his book, Fortress America, “the public was clamoring for the government to take 
action on terrorism, and creating DHS would certainly give the impression that the 
administration was doing all it could to prosecute the war on terror- not only abroad, but 
at home, as well.”115  By the time the 9/11 Commission released its detailed report in 
2004 imploring greater sharing of intelligence between the various agencies, the U.S. 
appeared to be well down the path towards a centrally-dominated domestic security 
arrangement. The long-term constitutional effects of these efforts appeared uncertain.  
But a funny thing happened on the way to consolidating power on the banks of 
the Potomac: The states began to assert themselves into the conversation by developing 
fusion centers and then staunchly advocating their inclusion into the broader national 
security construct. From a federalism perspective, these fusion centers represent a clear 
example of advancing non-federal interests in areas previously off-limits to the states. As 
homeland and national security imperatives became so intertwined over the course of the 
last decade, it is not a stretch to say fusion centers probably signify a major development 
not only for the routine jobs they perform on a day-to-day basis, but also for what they 
mean in the larger conversation of the American system of government. 
The final answer is not yet written and may be impossible to know right now. The 
small sample size of years not decades, the classified nature of the applicable elements, 
and the muddled boundaries so characteristic of homeland security preclude a long-term, 
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historical analysis of federalism as demonstrated by fusion centers. In addition, the 
United States is only halfway through the second presidential administration after 9/11 
and appears embroiled in an increasingly partisan political discourse. All of these factors 
(plus a host of others) weigh against a conclusive determination of how federalism will 
eventually play out. 
To get a better sense of what fusion centers might signify, it is important to 
address the framework in which the states previously operated from. Because the late 
19th century and all of the 20th century witnessed a sustained encroachment on 
federalism by the central government, it was more difficult for states to secure greater 
powers. In addition to the vivid post-Civil War affirmation of a more centrally unified 
United States, the subsequent decades also saw increasing demonstrations of national 
government prominence. The federal government asserted itself more frequently into the 
lives of its citizens through such measures as an omnipresent New Deal strategy, as well 
as the ensuing creation of numerous regulatory agencies within the vast domestic realm 
(Environmental Protection Agency, National Labor Relations Board, Occupational 
Health Safety Administration, etc.)  State capabilities vis-à-vis the federal government 
diminished over time as Washington’s influence crept into areas normally subject to local 
oversight.   
The concept of federalism was by no means a dying virtue of American 
governance, of course. State and localities functioned just fine, of course, and even 
successfully resisted some federal measures (i.e., the legal fight against the Brady Act 
background checks).116  Nevertheless, the trend remained one of the federal government 
generally holding sway over the states in what more or less amounted to a competition 
among the levels for control.   
However, what is past is not always prologue. The emerging environment in the 
aftershocks of 9/11 has altered what was once a zero-sum game of power shifting among 
the levels of control and governance. In other words, power gained by the federal 
government previously resulted in an equal loss for the states and localities. Today, when 
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all levels of government integrate more easily, homeland security requirements portend 
an era not only of mutual support, but mutual advances. For instance, states exercise 
some crucial national security responsibilities via fusion center operations, but that no 
longer translates into quantifiable powers being taken away from the federal government. 
At the same time, federal authorities now possess the means to utilize state and local law 
enforcement systems to enhance national security effectiveness while still leaving the 
sub-federal capabilities intact. Does this mean state-federal power struggles are a thing of 
the past? Absolutely not. Disputes over authorities and boundaries will remain an 
inherent difficulty with the American federal system, but the ultimate security goal is a 
shared one: protection of the homeland. States cannot do it themselves, nor can the 
national government. Fusion centers stand in as exemplary models for this new calculus 
of the American security environment. 
Fusion centers operate within a growing national network that fosters closer 
relationships with federal partners and delivers greater access to critical intelligence 
through an array of interconnected databases. As a result, states are becoming 
increasingly valuable partners in the fight to acquire, analyze, and disseminate the type of 
information necessary to help protect the nation. They are not mere conduits of 
intelligence, but rather full-fledged components functioning within the greater homeland 
security apparatus. Their actions, even the most mundane, incrementally advance the 
capabilities of the various states. Possessing the ability to be tailored to the specific needs 
of their municipalities and performing critical governmental functions unrelated to 
terrorism, fusion centers are indicative of a promising growth industry.   
Although serious questions remain unresolved, including the ever-present 
dilemma on civil liberties and who gets to see which information on American citizens, 
fusion centers signify a remarkable innovation for states to employ. Continued 
modernization and heightened network integration will yield even greater results in the 
years to come. Perhaps most significant of all, these fusion centers foretell a fundamental 
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